tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2454243285404839075.post7589842501661912829..comments2012-04-14T07:12:35.547-04:00Comments on Philosophical Instigations: Remark 32Charles T. Wolvertonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2454243285404839075.post-77551193745351893642012-04-14T07:12:35.547-04:002012-04-14T07:12:35.547-04:00One other thing to add: on my own blog I've ye...One other thing to add: on my own blog I've yet to address the question "what is thought?". Wittgenstein's survey of the grammar of THAT concept yields some very interesting results!Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2454243285404839075.post-63037462548528817232012-04-13T10:37:37.147-04:002012-04-13T10:37:37.147-04:00Thanks, Philip. Needless to say, I am neither an e...Thanks, Philip. Needless to say, I am neither an expert in child development nor - not having been a parent - even an experienced amateur. But at the high level I address the process, it seems unlikely that it is dramatically different from what I describe. And I agree with your point 3.Charles T. Wolvertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2454243285404839075.post-74887905277945071812012-04-13T06:03:19.316-04:002012-04-13T06:03:19.316-04:00Hi Charles, a few comments:
1. I am not an expert...Hi Charles, a few comments:<br /><br />1. I am not an expert on the cognitive abilities of children (neither was Wittgenstein). I'm really not qualified to comment meaningfully on research studies into how children develop linguistic abilities (neither was Wittgenstein).<br /><br />2. Having said that, I would broadly agree with Sellars' philosophical point about the inter-related nature of conceptual schemes and linguistic ability. A small child cannot think "Ah, so that word refers to that object" any more than a dog can (and for the same reason) - yet a basic behavioural connection can be established between word and object in both cases.<br /><br />3. Following from this, one intention lurking in 32 is (I think) to show up the philosophical incoherence of the Cartesian res cogitans - or, at least, it is a first small step along the way. "Thinking" (in the full, adult sense) is intimately connected with our physical abilities (including our linguistic abilities). We are not (pace Descartes) ghosts in machines.<br /><br />Hope this is helpful!Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.com